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Portfolio effects and efficiency of lending under 
Basel II 
Bank of Finland Research 
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Esa Jokivuolle – Timo Vesala 




Although beneficial allocational effects have been a central motivation for the 
Basel II capital adequacy reform, the interaction of these effects with Basel II’s 
procyclical impact has been less discussed. In this paper, we investigate the effect 
of Basel II on the efficiency of bank lending. We consider competitive credit 
markets where entrepreneurs may apply for loans for investments of different risk 
profiles. In this setting, excessive risk taking typically arises because low risk 
borrowers cross-subsidize high risk borrowers through the price system that is 
based on average success rates. We find that while flat-rate capital requirements 
(such as Basel I) amplify overinvestment in risky projects, risk-based capital 
requirements alleviate the cross-subsidization effect, improving allocational 
efficiency. This also suggests that Basel II does not necessarily lead to 
exacerbation of macroeconomic cycles because the reduction in the proportion of 
high-risk investments softens the cyclicality of bank lending over the business 
cycle. 
 
Key words: Basel II, bank regulation, capital requirements, credit risk, 
procyclicality 
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Basel II -vakavaraisuussääntelyn vaikutukset 
pankkiluottojen optimaaliseen kohdentumiseen 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 13/2007 
Esa Jokivuolle – Timo Vesala 




Pankkien vakavaraisuussääntelyn uudistuksessa (Basel II) on keskeisenä tavoit-
teena se, että sääntely tehostaisi pankkiluottojen kohdentumista. Toisaalta uusien 
vakavaraisuusvaatimusten pelätään vahvistavan suhdanteita. Näiden asioiden 
yhteisvaikutuksesta ei ole kuitenkaan juuri keskusteltu. Tässä tutkimuksessa tar-
kastellaan Basel II:n vaikutusta luottojen optimaaliseen kohdentumiseen. Kilpai-
lullisessa luottomarkkinamallissa yrittäjät voivat hakea luottoa projekteille, joilla 
on erilainen riski. Tämä johtaa liian suuriin riskipitoisiin investointeihin, koska 
luotonottajista alhaisen riskin ottavat kompensoivat suuren riskin ottavia sellaisen 
hintamekanismin kautta, joka perustuu todennäköisyyteen, miten yrittäjät onnistu-
vat keskimäärin. Tulokseksi saadaan, että kiinteä vakavaraisuusvaatimus voimis-
taa liiallisen investoinnin ongelmaa. Basel II:n kaltainen riskiperusteinen vaka-
varaisuusvaatimus sen sijaan lieventää ristisubventiota ja tehostaa siten luottojen 
kohdentumista. Tulokset viittaavat myös siihen, että Basel II -sääntely ei välttä-
mättä voimista suhdanteita, koska riskipitoisimpien investointien suhteellisen 
osuuden pieneneminen voi vähentää pankkien luotonannon suhdanneherkkyyttä. 
 
Avainsanat: Basel II, pankkisääntely, vakavaraisuusvaatimukset, luottoriski, 
myötäsyklisyys 
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The Basel II Accord introduces an important reﬁnement to bank regulation
practice as it proposes new, internal-ratings-based (IRB) capital requirements.
IRB means that the amount of capital a bank will need to hold against a
given asset will explicitly depend on the credit risk of that asset.1 Under the
previous regulatory framework (Basel I), banks faced a ﬁxed 8% minimum
capital requirement against any risky asset in their corporate loan portfolio.
The ‘ﬂat-rate’ capital requirement thus worked as a buﬀer against average
credit risks. As the cost of holding capital comes over to loan prices, the
ﬂat-rate requirement eﬀectively means that low risk customers cross-subsidize
high risk borrowers which increases the attractiveness of high risk loans and
thus raises the average credit risk in a bank’s loan portfolio. An obvious
advantage of the Basel II reform is that it alleviates these potential allocational
distortions across diﬀerent loan categories (see also the motivation provided
for Basel II by the Basel Committee, 2001). At the same time, however, it has
been argued that a potentially serious drawback of the reform is that the IRB
practice may fuel ‘procyclicality’ (see eg Kashyap and Stein, 2004, Gordy and
Howells, 2006, Pennacchi, 2005, provides a discussion of this literature). In a
downturn, when credit losses erode banks’ capital base, the default probability
of the surviving customers increases, implying that banks must hold more
capital against their portfolios. Since raising new capital during bad times
may be diﬃcult or very costly, banks may be forced to scale back their lending
activity, thereby exacerbating the recession.
Although the beneﬁcial allocational eﬀects have been a central motivation
for the Basel II reform, their interaction with Basel II’s procyclical impact has
been discussed only a little. Namely, the seriousness of the procyclicality issue
could depend on the risk-proﬁle of banks’ loan portfolios. If the relative share
of risky assets is high, then the need to collect fresh capital after a negative
shock may be signiﬁcant due to large credit losses and the substantial increase
in the default probability of the remaining borrowers.2 However, since IRB
unravels the cross-subsidization mechanism related to the ﬂat-rate regime, one
could think that IRB induces a general shift towards less risky portfolios.
The relevance of the procyclicality issue may thus depend on the magnitude
of this portfolio eﬀect, as it alleviates the potential squeeze in an economic
downturn due to higher capital requirements and credit losses. Moreover,
1More precisely, the bank is using a scale of internal ratings in which each credit customer
is categorized. The bank further estimates the average probability of default in each
rating category, which, along with other credit risk parameters, determines the minimum
capital requirement (for the details see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006).
Throughout this paper it is implicitly assumed that there is no moral hazard in banks’
determining the internal ratings and hence their own capital requirement. The consequences
of relaxing this assumption are studied eg in Blum (2007).
2It has been argued (see eg Peura and Jokivuolle, 2004) that banks can hold extra buﬀers
of capital in excess of the minimum capital requirement and thereby alleviate procyclical
eﬀects. Zicchino (2006) considers a bank which sets its capital level as part of its value
maximizing behaviour and ﬁnds that under Basel II lending is likely to be, nevertheless,
more responsive to macroeconomic shocks than under Basel I. An interesting related analysis
is also provided by Zhu (2007).
7this counterbalancing eﬀect may be coupled with a more eﬃcient allocation of
lending obtained with the IRB regime.3
In this paper, we construct a model where ‘entrepreneurs’ can choose
between investments of diﬀerent risk characteristics (as in Vesala, 2007), or
they can decide not to take up a risky investment at all. More speciﬁcally,
we consider two uncertain investment opportunities, an ‘high-risk’ and a
‘low-risk’ investment, and also an outside option that produces a ﬁxed payoﬀ
with certainty. Following De Meza and Webb (1987), entrepreneurs’ intrinsic
and unobservable ‘types’ determine their success rates in risky investments.
High-risk projects are more sensitive to entrepreneurs’ types than low-risk
i n v e s t m e n t sw h i l et h ep a y o ﬀ of the outside option is independent of the
intrinsic type. Eﬃcient resource allocation requires that entrepreneurs with
the highest types invest in high-risk projects, which also oﬀer the best payoﬀ
when successful, while entrepreneurs at the bottom end of the type distribution
d on o ti n v e s ta ta l lb u ts t i c kt ot h es a f eo u t s i d eo p t i o n . T y p e sl o c a t e d
in the middle should invest in low-risk projects. Banks cannot observe the
explicit success rate of an individual entrepreneur but they rationally expect
the equilibrium average success probabilities within each investment class.
Banks operate in competitive credit markets where loan prices for high-risk
and low-risk investments are determined by banks’ posterior beliefs about
average success rates within each investment category. The competitive loan
prices, in turn, govern entrepreneurs’ self-selection among diﬀerent investment
opportunities. Note that we do not consider capital markets as an alternative
source of ﬁnance for the entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs in the model
could perhaps best be understood as representing the small and medium
size corporate portfolio of banks. Therefore informational problems could be
a l l u d e dt oa st h er e a s o nw h yt h e s ee n t r e p r e n e u r sg ot ob a n k sf o rﬁnance.
Our objective is to investigate the eﬃciency of resource allocation in the
credit market under the ﬂat-rate and the risk-based capital requirements. The
conventional result in this kind of setting is that there is too much risk-taking
because low risk borrowers cross-subsidize high risk borrowers through the
price system that is based on average success rates (De Meza and Webb, 1987).4
We ﬁnd that the ﬂat-rate regime exacerbates this problem and it allocates too
much investment in high-risk projects. We also observe that the ﬂat-rate
capital requirements induce a trade-oﬀ between optimal composition of loans
and the eﬃciency of overall bank lending volume. Compared to the ﬂat-rate
regime, the risk-based capital requirements alleviate the cross-subsidization
eﬀect in high-risk investments and thereby reduce overinvestment in these
3There are also studies which investigate how Basel II regulation could be improved to
reduce the procyclical eﬀects. Kashyap and Stein (2004) and Gordy and Howells (2006)
suggest and consider time-varying capital requirements. However, Pennacchi (2005) argues
these studies do not take into account implications for deposit insurance losses and suggests
instead integration of risk-based deposit insurance with risk-based capital requirements to
reduce the procyclical impact.
4Overinvestment in high-risk assets, the central starting point of our analysis, is also
consistent with the view that risks may build up during economic upturns (see eg Borio
et al., 2001, and Rajan, 1994). Because the role of regulatory capital requirements is
accentuated particularly in such circumstances, we believe that the overinvestment problem
is an important setting to study the eﬀects of Basel II.
8projects. On the other hand, lower capital requirement against low-risk loans
increases entrepreneurs’ general participation in the credit market, so that the
overall lending volume is higher under the risk-based capital requirements than
under the ﬂat-rate regime. It is also shown that there exists a risk-based capital
requirement schedule that implements both the ﬁrst-best loan composition and
the ﬁrst-best lending volume.
Finally, we also assess the magnitude of the ‘portfolio eﬀect’ resulting from
the change in the regulatory framework and argue that the eﬀect can be
substantial. This is because under the ﬂa t - r a t er e g i m et h ea v e r a g eq u a l i t yo f
high-risk loans is decreasing with the ﬁxed capital requirement. In a long-run
equilibrium, poorer average loan quality requires higher capital holdings to
compensate the increased loss potential, which further deteriorates the average
success rate of high-risk investments. Under the risk-based capital regulation,
however, this vicious circle does not emerge but higher regulatory capital only
improves the average quality of high-risk loans. Therefore the new equilibrium
with risk-based capital requirements may feature (potentially) a much more
eﬃcient resource allocation. Moreover, reminiscent of Repullo (2004), a
strong portfolio eﬀect also implies that the introduction of risk-based capital
requirements would allow for a reduction in the overall level of regulatory
capital.5 Hence, regarding the discussion about Basel II and the procyclicality
of bank lending, our ﬁndings suggest that Basel II does not necessarily lead
to exacerbation of macroeconomic cycles (cf. Gordy and Howells, 2006).6 At
the least, the allocational eﬀects should be taken into account in assessing the
overall procyclical impact of a capital adequacy regime.
So far, there are only a handful of papers focusing on the portfolio eﬀect.
Maybe the closest study to ours is Repullo and Suarez (2004) which investigates
the loan pricing implications of Basel II capital requirements. They consider
both the ‘standardized’ approach based on external ratings as well as the
IRB approach.7 In their model, banks can diﬀerentiate by choosing either
the standardized approach or the IRB. Repullo and Suarez conclude that low
risk borrowers achieve reductions in loan rates as they do business with banks
using IRB. However, the prospects of high-risk borrowers may not be weakened
as they may borrow from banks adopting the standardized approach. Other
related studies mainly focus on the procyclicality issue without long-term
portfolio eﬀects (eg Kashyap and Stein, 2004),8 the justiﬁcations of ‘excess’
capital buﬀers (Allen, Carletti and Marquez, 2005), or empirical evidence
about the cyclical ﬂuctuations of these buﬀers (Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina,
5Interestingly, this is not stated to be the objective of Basel II. According to the Basel
Committee (2001), the goal of Basel II is ‘neither to produce a net increase nor a net
reduction — on average — in minimum regulatory capital’.
6Also the Basel Committee (2001) has pointed out that ‘(Basel I) which does not
adequately reﬂect changes in risk creates incentives for banks to make high-risk investments
that may contribute to cyclicality over the business cycle’.
7In Basel II banks have the option to use either the simpler and less risk-sensitive
standardized approach or the more sophisticated and risk-sensitive IRB approach, subject
to supervisory approval. In practice it is expected that large and sophisticated banks opt
for the latter. In the US, the largest banks will only have the choice of the IRB approach.
8An exception is, however, Gordy and Howells (2006) who consider procyclical eﬀects in
a simulation based approach including active portfolio management.
92003, Jokipii and Milne, 2007). Lastly, we refer to the paper by Repullo
(2004) where the role of capital requirements in preventing ‘gambling’ in bank
lending is stressed. He ﬁn d st h a tb o t ht h eﬂat-rate and the risk-based capital
regime can be successful in this objective, albeit under the risk-based system
the prevention of gambling is implemented with lower overall level of regulatory
capital. Our results suggest, however, that ﬂat-rate capital requirements
may actually increase ‘gampling’ (in the sense of overinvestment in the
riskiest projects by the entrepreneurs) whereas moving from ﬂat-rate capital
requirements to the risk-based system may signiﬁcantly reduce ‘gambling’ as
overinvestment in the riskiest projects is reduced.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 prescribes the general
modelling environment, and section 3 presents equilibrium analysis.
Implications on the procyclicality debate are discussed in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
Entrepreneurs have access to either an ‘high-risk’ or a ‘low-risk’ investment.
When successful, a high-risk project produces v while the output of a low-risk
investment is of worth s<v . If a project fails it produces nothing, regardless of
the type of the investment. Entrepreneurs diﬀer in their ‘intrinsic types’. The
type parameter θ is distributed over Θ =[ 0 ,1] a c c o r d i n gt oas t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n g
function G(θ). G(θ) is common knowledge but the actual realization of θ is
entrepreneur’s private information. The success probability of an investment
depends on entrepreneur’s type θ. The type dependent success rates of a
high-risk and a low-risk investment are denoted by p(θ) and q(θ) respectively,
so that the expected outputs are p(θ)v and q(θ)s. We assume
p
0(θ) >q
0(θ) > 0,∀θ ∈ Θ. (2.1)
Hence, while both success rates are strictly increasing in θ,ah i g h - r i s k
investment is riskier than a low-risk one as it is more sensitive to entrepreneur’s
intrinsic type.
Instead of making an investment, entrepreneurs may also choose an outside
option (eg participation in the labor market) which produces an exogenously
given payoﬀ w. The magnitude of this ﬁxed payoﬀ is independent of θ.
Moreover, we assume
p(1)v>q (1)s>wbut p(0)v<q (0)s<w , (2.2)
ie, a high-risk investment has the greatest expected output for entrepreneurs
at the upper end of the type distribution while entrepreneurs at the bottom
end of the distribution should choose the outside option.
The implementation of any new investment requires external ﬁnance equal
to a constant amount, I. These external resources can be obtained from
competitive credit markets where banks deliver standard debt contracts. If I
units of ﬁnancial capital were invested elsewhere in the ﬁnancial markets, banks
could earn ¯ R. ¯ R thus serves as the opportunity cost of ﬁnance. Moreover, the
10regulator requires the banks to raise equity capital K.U n d e r t h e ﬂat rate
regime, the requirement is to hold at least a minimum capital K = ¯ k per unit
of loans, regardless of the risk status of the asset. Under the risk-based regime,
however, the requirement is to hold K = kv per unit of high-risk loans and
K = ks per unit of low-risk loans.
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s : 9
Stage 1
Nature draws entrepreneurs’ types from the distribution G(θ) with support
Θ =[ 0 ,1].
Stage 2
Entrepreneurs choose whether to invest in an uncertain project or stick to the
safe outside option. If they choose to invest, they need external ﬁnance in order
to implement the project. Before entering the credit market, entrepreneurs
have to ﬁx the business plan for which they are seeking ﬁnance. Banks can
observe whether the chosen project is high-risk or low-risk, and they are able
to monitor the implementation of the chosen project.
Stage 3
Entrepreneurs and banks trade in a competitive credit market. Upon a trading
opportunity, loan contracts can only be conditioned on the observable project
characteristics but not on the unobservable entrepreneur type.
Stage 4
Outputs are realized. If the project has been successful, the bank receives the
repayment and the entrepreneur keeps the residual. A failure incurs a credit
loss to the bank.









fb)s − ¯ R = w.( 2 . 3 )
The upper index in these thresholds stands for ‘ﬁrst-best’ as eﬃcient resource
allocation is obtained when types θ ∈ [θ
fb
,1] choose high-risk investments,
types θ ∈ [θ
fb,θ
fb
) stick to low-risk projects and types θ ∈ [0,θ
fb) choose the
ﬁxed outside option.
In the market solution, the marginal type that is indiﬀerent between a
high-risk and a low-risk investment is denoted by θ. Since any type above this
cut-oﬀ has a greater success probability (and thereby greater expected payoﬀ)
in a high-risk project than the type θ, it must hold that types θ>θ strictly
prefer high-risk investments over low-risk ones. Correspondingly, types θ<θ
strictly prefer low-risk projects over high-risk investments. As an application
9The sequence of events adopted here draws on the model by Vesala (2007).
11of Bayes’ rule, the expected success probability of an entrepreneur with a






Similarly, the type that is indiﬀerent between a low-risk investment and the
outside option is denoted by θ. Again we must have that types θ <θ<θ
strictly prefer a low-risk investment and types θ<θstrictly prefer choosing
the ﬁxed payoﬀ. The expected success probability of an entrepreneur with a






In competitive credit markets, banks make on average zero proﬁts in their
lending business. In other words, the expected repayment just covers the
opportunity cost of ﬁnance ¯ R plus the value of the regulatory equity capital
K;i e ,p(ˆ θv)Rv = ¯ R + K and q(ˆ θs)Rs = ¯ R + K where Rv and Rs denote
the competitive loan rates for high-risk and low-risk investments respectively.
Solving for Rv and Rs yields
Rv =
¯ R + K
p(ˆ θv)
and Rs =
¯ R + K
q(ˆ θs)
.
Entrepreneurial payoﬀs from high-risk and low-risk investments are given by
πv(θ,ˆ θv)=p(θ)(v − Rv)=p(θ)v −
p(θ)
p(ˆ θv)
( ¯ R + K), (2.6)
πs(θ,ˆ θs)=q(θ)(s − Rs)=q(θ)s −
q(θ)
q(ˆ θs)
( ¯ R + K). (2.7)
3 Equilibrium analysis
Entrepreneurs choose their projects by comparing the expected payoﬀsf r o m
high-risk and low-risk investments, and from the ﬁxed outside option. The
marginal type θ is indiﬀerent between the two investment options and θ
between a low-risk investment and the safe payoﬀ. Banks, who observe
entrepreneurs’ investment choices but not their explicit types, use the Bayes’
rules in (2.4) and (2.5) to update their posterior beliefs about the average
success probabilities of a high-risk and a low-risk investment. As a formal
deﬁnition, we have:



















































123.1 Flat-rate capital requirements
Under ﬂat-rate capital requirements, K = ¯ k regardless of the type of the











































v denote the equilibrium values of θ and ˆ θv under the ﬂat-rate
regime.
Proposition 3.2 Given the ﬂat-rate capital requirements, there is
overinvestment in high-risk projects as entrepreneurs with ineﬃciently







v < ˆ θ
fb
v .
Proof: Follows from the observation that the RHS of (3.1) is strictly negative,




and thereby ˆ θ
FR
v < ˆ θ
fb
v .¥
By equation (3.1) it is obvious that the overinvestment problem would
exist also without any extra capital requirement, ie, when ¯ k =0 .T h i si st h e
conventional DeMeza-Webb (1987) overinvestment result and it stems from
the eﬀect that the high types investing in high-risk projects cross-subsidize
the low types investing in similar projects through the price system that
is based on average success rates. A ﬂat-rate capital requirement, which
indiscriminately comes over to all loan prices regardless of the average risk
level of the loan, ampliﬁes overinvestment in high-risk projects because the
marginal type becomes cross-subsidized for this extra cost in the market for
high-risk loans while in the category of low-risk loans she would be the one who
would cross-subsidize entrepreneurs with lower success rates. Hence, the higher
is the ﬂat-rate requirement ¯ k the greater is the distortion towards high-risk
investments.
Second, from the equilibrium condition (ii) it follows that
q(θ















Remark 3.3 The cut-oﬀ θ
FR, which determines the division of entrepreneurs








− 1) ¯ R ≡ ¯ k
fb.
If ¯ k<¯ kfb entrepreneurs with ineﬃciently low success rates choose to invest in
low-risk projects. On the other hand, if ¯ k>¯ kfb, too many entrepreneurs opt
to choose the ﬁxed payoﬀ.
13Proof: Follows directly from (2.3) and (3.2).¥
Since the extra capital requirement does not hit the payoﬀ from the
ﬁxed outside option, ¯ k can be used to limit market participation. At the
margin where entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between taking up a low-risk
investment and opting the safe payoﬀ the capital requirement reduces the
incentive to invest and thus alleviates the excess market entry due to the
cross-subsidization eﬀect. ¯ kfb is exactly the level of regulatory capital that
implements the ﬁrst-best division. If the capital requirement is greater than
this, there will be underinvestment. Also observe that as the distortion in
the high-risk investment margin is minimized when ¯ k =0the introduction
of a ﬂat-rate capital adequacy regime necessarily induces a trade-oﬀ between
optimal composition of loans and the eﬃciency of the overall bank lending
volume. Obviously, the ﬂat-rate capital requirement which minimizes the
overall distortions is somewhere in between 0 and ¯ kfb;i et h e r ew i l lb e
both overinvestment in expansionay projects and excess market entry by
entrepreneurs.
3.2 Risk-based capital requirements
Under the risk-based capital requirements, K = kv for high-risk investments




























Similarly, the condition (ii) now reads as
q(θ















Remark 3.4 The cut-oﬀs θ
RB
and θ






















− 1) ¯ R ≡ k
fb
v
Proof: Follows directly from (2.3), (3.3) and (11).¥
Remark 3.4 states that, contrary to the ﬂat-rate regime, there exists a
risk-based capital requirement schedule that implements both the ﬁrst-best
loan composition and the ﬁrst-best lending volume. This is quite natural,
of course, as the risk-based system oﬀers as many independent instruments
to aﬀect allocational eﬃciency as there are diﬀerent loan categories. This
14is not the case under the ﬁxed capital requirement where there is only
one instrument and eﬃciency can be obtained only at the margin where
entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between investment and the safe outside option.
Since the indiﬀerence condition between a low-risk investment and the safe
outside option is essentially the same under both regimes, the eﬃcient overall
lending volume is implemented when the risk-based capital requirement for
low-risk investments coincide with the ﬂat-rate requirement given in Remark
3.3; ie, ¯ kfb = kfb
s . In turn, as p(ˆ θ
fb




) >q (ˆ θ
fb
s ),t h er i s k - b a s e d
c a p i t a lr e q u i r e m e n ta g a i n s th i g h - r i s ki n v e s t m e n t st h a ti m p l e m e n t st h ee ﬃcient
loan composition must be strictly greater than the capital requirement against
low-risk loans; ie, it must hold that kfb
v >k fb
s = ¯ kfb.
In practice, fostering allocational eﬃciency is hardly the only — nor even
the most important — objective of bank capital regulation. The primary
goal of a regulator is to ensure that the capital holdings suﬃce to cover the
potential credit losses incurred in the case when the economy is hit by an
unexpected negative shock.10 Here we assume that such a negative shock
causes a downward shift in the success probability functions p(θ) and q(θ),
and tha t the shock has greater impact on prospects of high-risk investments.
Hence, the amount of credit losses incurred by the shock are decreasing in the
average success rates p(ˆ θv) and q(ˆ θs), and it should hold for the required capital
holdings that kv(ˆ θv) >k s(ˆ θs). What we are still missing is the linkage between
these risk-based capital requirements and the ﬂat-rate measure ¯ k.I nal o n gr u n
equilibrium, it is plausible to assume that the relationship between the ﬂat-rate
and the risk-based capital requirement is such that the ﬂat-rate requirement is
roughly equal to a ’weighted average’ of the hypothetical risk-based schedule











As an immediate consequence of this we have ks(ˆ θs) < ¯ k<k v(ˆ θv),a n d








Hence, there is less investment in high-risk projects under the risk-based
capital requirements than under the ﬂat-rate capital requirements but the overall
lending volume under the risk-based regime is greater than under the ﬂat-rate
regime.
Proof: Follows from the observations that the RHS of equation (3.3) is strictly
larger than the RHS of equation (3.1), while the RHS of equation (3.4) is
strictly smaller than that of equation (3.2).¥
Compared to the ﬂat-rate regime, the risk-based capital adequacy regime
alleviates overinvestment in high-risk projects because it counterbalances the
10Ie a shock that entails a realization of risks which are not fully internalized in the
competitive loan prices.
15cross-subsidization eﬀe c ta tt h em a r g i nw h e r ee n t r e p r e n e u r sa r ei n d i ﬀerent
between high-risk and low-risk projects. On the other hand, lower capital
requirement against low-risk loans increases entrepreneurs’ participation to the
credit market, so that the overall lending volume is higher under the risk-based
system than under the ﬂat-rate regime. Moreover, from equation (3.5) and
Proposition 3.5 it follows that the average capital holding against a risky asset,
ie either a low-risk or a high-risk loan, is larger under the ﬂat-rate regime than
under the risk-based system because the allocation of ﬁnancial resources is less
eﬃcient with the ﬂat-rate requirements.
We have now demonstrated the presumable eﬀect of Basel II on the
composition of banks’ loan portfolios. However, it is also important to try
to assess the magnitude of this eﬀect. Figure 1 illustrates how the equilibrium
volume of investment in high-risk projects changes when risk-based capital
requirements replace the old ﬂat-rate system. The vertical axis represents
the average success probability in high-risk investments. The average success
rate is at the highest when only the very top end of the type distribution
invests in high-risk projects (ie, when θ → 1 so that p(ˆ θv) → p(ˆ θ
1
v)). In
this extreme case, both ¯ k and kv(ˆ θ
RB
v ) approach to ks(ˆ θ
1
s) as only low-risk
investments are undertaken. ks(ˆ θ
1
s) is the equilibrium regulatory capital in
this scenario. On the other hand, when θ → 0 (and hence p(ˆ θv) → p(ˆ θ
0
v))
all entrepreneurs invest in high-risk projects and the two alternative capital
regulation systems virtually coincide. Generally, however, ¯ k<k v(ˆ θ
RB
v ) because
¯ k is levied also on low-risk projects so that the burden to hold capital against
high-risk investments is lower. The main insight in Figure 1 is that the change
from the ﬂat-rate capital requirements to the risk-based capital regulation
may have a substantial eﬀect on banks’ loan portfolio (measured by the
vertical axis in Figure 1). This is because under the ﬂat-rate regime the
equilibrium cut-oﬀ θ
FR
, which also determines the average success probability
p(ˆ θ
FR
v ),i sd e c r e a s i n gi nt h eﬁxed capital requirement ¯ k while under the
risk-based regulation the cut-oﬀ θ
RB
(and thus p(ˆ θ
RB
v ))i si n c r e a s i n gi nkv.
Hence, under the ﬂat-rate regime, higher capital requirements worsen the
average quality of high-risk loans, which again requires higher capital holdings
to compensate the increased loss potential. Under the risk-based capital
regulation, however, such a trade-oﬀ between the level of capital requirement
and the eﬃciency of entrepreneurial selection does not emerge but higher
regulatory capital improves the average quality of high-risk loans. The new
equilibrium may therefore feature a much more eﬃcient resource allocation.
Also the overall level of regulatory capital may be signiﬁcantly reduced. It
should be emphasised, however, that Figure 1 merely illustrates the potential
consequence of the Basel II changeover; it is not suitable for a conclusive
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Figure 1: Equilibria under ﬂat-rate and risk-based capital requirements
4 Implications on procyclicality
Since the allocational eﬀect analysed in this paper potentially has a bearing
on the vulnerability of the economy to shocks, it should be taken into
account in assessing the overall propensity of a capital adequacy regime to
procyclicality. The alleged procyclical impact of the Basel II may turn out
to be less pronounced if the reduced proportion of high-risk investments
softens the cyclicality of bank lending over the business cycle. This argument
is in line with the view of Gordy and Howells (2006) who also note that
the endogenous response by banks to Basel II does not necessarily lead to
exacerbation of macroeconomic cycles. In this section we provide a discussion
of the implications of our previous analysis on procyclicality under Basel I
ﬂat-rate capital requirements versus Basel II risk-based capital requirements.
T h ea r g u m e n t a t i o ni sh e u r i s t i ci nn a t u r eb u tm a k e su s eo ft h er e s u l t so fo u r
analytical model.
Let us ﬁrst assume that the overall amount of lending is eﬃcient under
both Basel I and Basel II capital requirement regimes. Under Basel I there
is overinvestment in high-risk projects whereas under Basel II the eﬃcient
allocation between high-risk and low-risk projects can be implemented. Now
consider a negative shock to the economy in the current period, which leads
to a materialization of loan losses from the risky investment projects.11 Under
Basel I, total losses are higher than under the risk-based regime because of
the overinvestment in high-risk projects. How is lending in the next period
aﬀected? If banks’ are capital constrained in that their capital buﬀers are
insuﬃcient to absorb the losses and external capital is costly or simply diﬃcult
to get at short notice, banks will have to cut lending in order to absorb the
11Note that our analytical model has been static. However, when discussing procyclicality
we essentially need to consider dynamic eﬀects. We may think of an economy which starts
in a boom in the ﬁrst period and is then hit by a negative aggregate shock in the second
period.
17losses and not to violate the minimum capital requirement, which could be
very costly. The lending cut may then fuel the economic downturn. This is
the procyclical eﬀect. Because losses are higher under Basel I, the procyclical
eﬀect is ceteris paribus, also more severe. Now consider that if Proposition 2
holds, a changeover to Basel II would increase the overall volume of lending
which, other things equal, would expose the economy to more credit losses and
hence more procyclicality.12 Nonetheless, as the increase in lending volume
would result from the increase in the number of low-risk projects which are
less prone to losses in economic downturns, we would conjecture that Basel
II’s dampening eﬀect on procyclicality through correcting the overinvestment
in high-risk projects would dominate.
On the other hand, a negative shock to the economy would also raise the
probability of default of the non-defaulted risky assets which hence are subject
to a higher capital requirement under Basel II than under Basel I. Hence, the
procyclical eﬀect resulting directly from capital requirements is bigger under
Basel II. This is the standard view why Basel II is considered to be the more
procyclical capital regime. The net of the above eﬀe c t sr e m a i n sa no p e ni s s u e :
we can not say which of the two capital regimes is the more procyclical one.
Nonetheless, our analysis of the portfolio eﬀects of the two diﬀerent regulatory
capital regimes does suggest that Basel II may be less procyclical than hitherto
understood. The uncertain overall eﬀect on procyclicality of the two regimes
also implies that we can not say for sure which of them implies a higher social
welfare. We conjecture, however, that Basel II is a stronger candidate for
being better for the social welfare because, in the light of our model, it can
correct the fundamental overinvestment problem stemming from asymmetric
information, which Basel I only makes worse.13
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the eﬀect of risk-based capital adequacy
regulation, such as Basel II, on the eﬃciency of resource allocation in credit
markets. Allocational eﬃciency is driven by entrepreneurs’ self-selection
among investments of diﬀerent risk categories. The conventional result (eg
De Meza and Webb, 1987) in this kind of setting is that there is too much
risk-taking because low risk borrowers cross-subsidize high risk borrowers
through the price system that is based on average success rates. We ﬁnd
12For the corporate credit portfolio the lowest risk-weights of the Internal Ratings Based
Approach of Basel II are clearly lower than the 8% ﬂat-rate requirement of Basel I. Moreover,
the goal of Basel II has been to calibrate the IRB risk-weights in such a way that the overall
amount of capital in the banking sector does not change much. In this respect it is plausible
to assume that Proposition 2 holds.
13Elizalde and Repullo (2006) state that ‘In principle, regulatory capital should be derived
from the maximization of a social welfare function that takes into account the costs (eg
increase in the cost of credit) and the beneﬁts (eg reduction in the probability of bank failure)
of capital regulation.’ In terms of Elizalde and Repullo (2006), the eﬃciency aspect of our
model apparently relates to the cost of credit; that is, socially optimal capital regulation
should also, if possible, ensure eﬃcient credit allocation through the price system. Of course,
there could also be a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and ﬁnancial stability.
18that a ﬂat-rate capital requirement regime (such as Basel I) exacerbates this
problem and it allocates too much investment in high-risk projects. The
risk-based capital requirements, in turn, alleviate the cross-subsidization eﬀect,
improving allocational eﬃciency in the credit market. The ability of Basel II
type of capital requirements to improve allocational eﬃciency, formalized in
this paper, is important also in the light of the view that excessive risks may
tend to build up during good times (see eg Borio et al, 2001, and Rajan,
1994). Moreover, lower capital requirement against less risky loans increases
entrepreneurs’ general participation in the credit market, so that the overall
lending volume is higher under the risk-based capital requirements than under
the ﬂat-rate regime. It is also shown that there exists a risk-based capital
requirement schedule that implements both the ﬁrst-best loan composition and
the ﬁrst-best lending volume. We argue that the magnitude of the ‘portfolio
eﬀect’ resulting from the Basel II changeover can be substantial. This suggests
that Basel II does not necessarily lead to exacerbation of macroeconomic
cycles because the reduction in the suboptimally high proportion of high-risk
investments, which may have resulted under Basel I, should mitigate the
cyclicality of bank lending over the business cycle.
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